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Abstract
There has been extremely rapid transformation of the food retail sector in developing regions in the
past  5  to10  years,  accompanied  by  a  further  consolidation  and  multi-nationalization  of  the
supermarket sector itself. This organizational change, accompanied by intense competition, has driven
changes in the organization of procurement systems of supermarket chains, toward centralized and
regionalized systems, use of specialized/dedicated wholesalers and preferred supplier systems, and
demanding, private quality standards. These changes in the system have in turn determined the very
recent rise of the use of contracts between supermarkets and agrifood producers in these regions to
cover provision of services and provision for risk management, as well as requirements for demanding
quality and safety attributes, which require substantial investment in technological change and
‘upgrading’ at the producer level. This paper presents a brief discussion of these trends, followed by a
conceptual framework to explain this phenomenon, illustrated with empirical evidence drawn mainly
from Latin America.




1 are traditionally viewed by development economists, policymakers, and practitioners as
the rich world’s place to shop. The three regions discussed here have the great majority of the poor on
the planet. But supermarkets are no longer just niche players for rich consumers in the capital cities of
the countries in these regions. The rapid rise of supermarkets in these regions in the past 5 to 10 years
has transformed agrifood markets, albeit at different rates and depths across regions and countries.
Many of those transformations present great challenges – even exclusion – for small farms, processing
and distribution firms, but also potentially great opportunities. Development models, policies and
programmes need to adapt to this radical change.
This paper describes this transformation of agrifood systems in Africa, Asia (excluding Japan) and
Latin America. First, we describe the traditional retail and wholesale system in the midst of which
emerged modern food retailing and its procurement system. Second, we discuss the determinants of
and patterns in the diffusion of supermarkets in the three regions. Third, we discuss the evolution of
procurement  systems  of  those  supermarkets,  and  consequences  for  agrifood  systems  from  the
perspectives of organizational, institutional and technological change. In the conclusions we suggest
emerging implications for farms and firms in the developing regions.
2.  The Spread of Supermarkets in Developing Regions
2
Determinants of diffusion of supermarkets
The determinants of the diffusion of supermarkets in developing regions can be conceptualized as a
system of demand by consumers for supermarket services, and supply of supermarket services, hence
investments by supermarket entrepreneurs.
On the demand side, several forces drive the observed increase in demand for supermarket services
(and are similar to those observed in Europe and the United States in the twentieth century). The
“demand incentives” side forces include urbanization, with the consequent entry of women into the
workforce outside the home, which increased the opportunity cost of women’s time and their incentive
to seek shopping convenience and processed foods to save cooking time; and supermarkets, often in
combination with large-scale food manufacturers, which reduced the prices of processed products.
On the “demand capacity” side, several variables were key. Real mean per capita income growth in
many countries of the regions during the 1990s, along with the rapid rise of the middle class, increased
demand for processed foods – the entry point for supermarkets, as they could offer greater variety and
lower cost of these products than traditional retailers due to economies of scale in procurement. Rapid
growth in ownership of refrigerators during the 1990s meant the ability to shift from daily shopping in
traditional retail shops to weekly or monthly shopping. Growing access to cars and public transport
reinforced this trend.
The supply of supermarket services was driven by several forces, only a subset of which overlap
with the drivers of initial supermarket diffusion in Europe and the United States. On the “supply
incentives” side, the development of supermarkets was very slow before (roughly) the early to mid-
1990s, as only domestic/local capital was involved. In the 1990s and after, foreign direct investment
(FDI) was crucial to the take-off of supermarkets. The incentive to undertake FDI by chains from 
1 For simplicity, we use the term “supermarkets” to indicate all large-format modern retail (supermarkets, hypermarkets,
discount and club stores, which typically constitute about 95 percent of the sales of modern retail in developing countries, the
rest being chain convenience stores), distinguishing formats only where necessary.
2 This section and the next draw on several publications, in particular on Reardon and  Timmer (forthcoming) and Reardon et
al. 2003a for overall trends; as well as: for Latin America, Reardon and Berdegue 2002, Balsevich et al. 2003 and Berdegue et
al. 2004; for Central and Eastern Europe, Dries et al. 2004; for China, Hu et al. 2004; and for Africa, Weatherspoon and Reardon
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Europe, the United States and Japan, and chains in richer countries in the regions under study (such
as Hong Kong, South Africa and Costa Rica), was due to saturation and intense competition in home
markets and much higher profit margins to be made by investing in developing markets. For example,
Carrefour earned three times higher margins on average in its Argentine compared to its French
operations in the 1990s (Gutman 2002). Moreover, initial competition in the receiving regions was
weak, generally with little fight put up by traditional retailers and domestic-capital supermarkets, and
there are distinct advantages to early entry, especially occupation of key retail locations.
On the “supply capacity” side, there was a deluge of FDI induced by the policy of full or partial
liberalization of retail sector FDI undertaken in many countries in the three regions in the 1990s and
after (e.g. partial liberalization of retail trade in China in 1992, with full liberalization of the sector
scheduled for 2004; Brazil, Mexico, Argentina in 1994; various African countries via South African
investment after apartheid ended in the mid 1990s; Indonesia in 1998; India in 2000). Overall FDI
grew 5- to 10-fold over the 1990s in these regions (UNCTAD 2001) and growth of FDI in food
retailing mirrored that overall growth. In addition, retail procurement logistics technology and
inventory management (such as efficient consumer response, ECR, an inventory management practice
that minimizes inventories-on-hand, and use of internet and computers for inventory control and
supplier–retailer coordination) were revolutionized in the 1990s. This was led by global chains and is
diffusing now in developing regions through knowledge transfer and imitation and innovation by
domestic supermarket chains.
These changes were in turn key to the ability to centralize procurement and consolidate distribution
in order to “drive costs out of the system”, a phrase used widely in the retail industry. Substantial
savings were thus possible through efficiency gains, economies of scale and coordination cost
reductions. China Resources Enterprise (2002), for example, notes that it is saving 40 percent in
distribution costs by combining modern logistics with centralized distribution in its two large new
distribution centers in southern China. These efficiency gains fuel profits for investment in new stores,
and, through intense competition, reduce prices to consumers of essential food products.
Patterns of diffusion
The incentive and capacity determinants of demand for and supply of supermarket services vary
markedly over the three regions, within individual countries, and within zones and between rural and
urban areas at the country level. Several broad patterns may be observed.
One pattern is from earliest to latest adopter of supermarkets; the regions range from Latin
America to Asia to Africa, roughly reflecting the ordering of income, urbanization and infrastructure
and policies that favour supermarket growth. The first wave of supermarket diffusion hit major cities
in the larger or richer countries of Latin America. The second wave hit in East/Southeast Asia and
Central Europe; the third in small or poorer countries of Latin America and Asia (including, for
example, Central America) and southern, then eastern, Africa. By this time, secondary cities and towns
in the areas of the “first wave” were being hit. The fourth wave, just starting now, is hitting southern
Asia and western Africa.
Latin America has led the way among developing regions in the growth of the supermarket sector.
While a small number of supermarkets existed in most countries during and before the 1980s, they
were  primarily  domestic  capital  firms,  and  tended  to  exist  in  major  cities  and  wealthier
neighbourhoods. That is, they were essentially a niche retail market comprising a maximum of 10 to
20 percent of national food retail sales in 1990. However, by 2000 supermarkets had risen to occupy
50 to 60 percent of national food retail among the Latin American countries, almost approaching the
70 to 80 percent share in the United States or France. Latin America had thus seen in a single decade
the same development of supermarkets that the United States experienced in five decades.
The supermarket share of food retail sales for the leading six Latin American countries averages 30
to 75 percent: Brazil has the highest share, followed by Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and
Mexico. Those six countries account for 85 percent of the income and 75 percent of the population ine-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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Latin America. Other countries in the region have also experienced rapid growth of their supermarket
sectors, but these started later and from a lower base. For example, supermarkets accounted for 15
percent of national food retail in Guatemala in 1994 and by 2002 accounted for 35 percent (Reardon
and Berdegue 2002).
The development of the supermarket sector in East and Southeast Asia is generally similar to that
of Latin America. The “take-off” stage of supermarkets in Asia started, on average, some five to seven
years  behind  that  of  Latin  America,  but  is  registering  even  faster  growth.  The  average
processed/packaged food retail share over several Southeast Asian countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand – is 33 percent, but is 63 percent for the East Asian countries of the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan (ACNielsen 2002). The supermarket sector in China is the fastest-growing in the world: it
started in 1991, by 2003 had 55 billion dollars of sales and 30 percent of urban food retail, and is
growing by 30 to 40 percent a year (Hu et al. 2004).
Supermarket diffusion is also occurring rapidly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This is
occurring in three waves, with the earliest (mid 1990s) takeoff of the sector in northern CEE (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), where the share of supermarkets in food retail now stands at
40 to 50 percent. The second wave is in southern CEE (such as Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovenia), where the share is on average 25 to 30 percent but growing rapidly. The third wave is in
Eastern Europe, where income and urbanization conditions were present for a takeoff but policy
reforms lagged, so that the share in, for example, Russia is still only 10 percent – but identified by
international retailers as the number one retail FDI destination (Dries, Reardon and Swinnen 2004).
The most recent
3 venue for supermarket take-off is in Africa, especially in eastern and southern
Africa. South Africa is the front runner, with roughly a 55 percent share of supermarkets in overall
food retail and 1700 supermarkets for 35 million persons. The great majority of that spectacular rise
has come since the end of apartheid in 1994. To put these figures in perspective, note that 1 700
supermarkets is roughly equivalent to 350 000 mom and pop stores, or “spazas,” in sales. Moreover,
South African chains have recently invested in 13 other African countries as well as India, Australia
and the Philippines. Kenya is the other front-runner, with 300 supermarkets and a 20 percent share of
supermarkets in urban food retail (Neven and Reardon 2004). Other African countries are starting to
experience  the  same  trends:  for  example,  Zimbabwe  and  Zambia  have  50  100  supermarkets
(Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003).
Second, within each of the four very broad regions there are large differences over sub-regions and
countries. Usually, these can be supermarket-growth-ranked according to the variables in the supply
and demand model presented above. In Latin America, for example, Brazil with a 75 percent share of
supermarkets in food retail store sales can be contrasted with Bolivia with at most 10 percent; in
developing Asia, Korea with 60 percent can be contrasted with India with 5 percent; and in Africa,
South Africa with 55 percent can be contrasted with Nigeria with 5 percent; Hungary or Poland with
shares of 40 to 50 percent can be contrasted with Russia with 10 percent.
Third, the take-over of food retailing in these regions has occurred much more rapidly in
processed, dry, and packaged foods such as noodles, milk products and grains, for which supermarkets
have an advantage over mom and pop stores due to economies of scale. The supermarkets’ progress in
gaining control of fresh food markets has been slower, and there is greater variation across countries
because of local habits and responses by wetmarkets and local shops. Usually the first fresh food
categories for the supermarkets to gain a majority share include “commodities” such as potatoes, and
sectors experiencing consolidation in first-stage processing and production: often chicken, beef and
pork, and fish.
A rough rule of thumb, applicable from Latin America, is that the share of supermarkets in fresh
foods is roughly one-half of the share in packaged foods. For example, in Brazil, where the overall
food retail share of supermarkets is 75 percent, the share in Sao Paulo of fresh fruits and vegetables is
3 South Asia is poised at the edge of a take-off, with the share of supermarkets in India at 5 percent, but identified as number 2
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only 50 percent; in Argentina, the shares are 60 and 25 percent, respectively. This kind of rough “2 or
3 to 1” ratio appears to be typical in the regions. This difference is also common in developed
countries: in France, supermarkets have 70 percent of overall food retail, but only 50 percent of fresh
fruits and vegetables. The convenience and low prices of small shops and fairs, with fresh and varied
produce for daily shopping, continues to be a competitive challenge to the supermarket sector, with
usually steady but much slower progress for supermarkets requiring investments in procurement
efficiency.
Despite the slower growth in the supermarket share of the domestic fresh produce market, it is very
revealing to calculate the absolute market that supermarkets now represent, even in produce, and thus
how much more in other products where supermarkets have penetrated faster and deeper. For example,
Reardon and Berdegue (2002) calculate that supermarkets in Latin America buy two and a half times
more fruits and vegetables from local producers than all the exports of produce from Latin America to
the rest of the world.
Fourth, the supermarket sector in these regions is increasingly and overwhelmingly multi-
nationalized (foreign-owned) and consolidated. The multi-nationalization of the sector is illustrated in
Latin America where global multinationals constitute roughly 70 to 80 percent of the top five chains in
most countries. This element of “FDI-driven” differentiates supermarket diffusion in these regions
from that in the United States and Europe. The tidal wave of FDI in retail was mainly due to the global
retail multinationals Ahold, Carrefour and Wal-Mart, smaller global chains such as Casino, Metro and
Makro, and regional multinationals such as Dairy Farm International (Hong Kong) and Shoprite
(South Africa). In some larger countries domestic chains, sometimes in joint ventures with global
multinationals, have taken the fore. For example, the top chain in Brazil is Pão de Açúcar (in
partnership with Casino, of France, since 1999), and the top chain in China is the giant national chain
Lianhua (based in Shanghai), with some 2 500 stores, in partial joint venture with Carrefour.
The rapid consolidation of the sector in those regions mirrors what is occurring in the United States
and Europe. For example, in Latin America the top five chains per country have 65 percent of the
supermarket sector (versus 40 percent in the US and 72 percent in France). The consolidation takes
place mainly via foreign acquisition of local chains (and secondarily by larger domestic chains
absorbing smaller chains and independents). This is done via large amounts of FDI: for example, in the
first eight months of 2002, five global retailers (British Tesco, French Carrefour and Casino, Dutch
Ahold and Makro, and Belgian Food Lion) spent 6 billion bhat, or US$120 million in Thailand
(Jitpleechep 2002). Wal-Mart spent US$660 million during 2002 in Mexico to build new stores.
These trends of multi-nationalization and consolidation fit the supply function of our supermarket
diffusion model. Global and retail multinationals have access to investment funds from their own
liquidity and to international credit that is much cheaper than the credit accessible by their domestic
rivals. The multinationals also have access to best practices in retail and logistics, some of which they
developed as proprietary innovations. Global retailers adopt retailing and procurement technology
generated by their own firms or, increasingly, via joint ventures with global logistics multinationals,
such as Carrefour (France) does with Penske Logistics (United States) in Brazil. Where domestic firms
have competed, they have had to make similar investments; these firms either had to enter joint
ventures with global multinationals, or had to get low-cost loans from their governments (e.g. the
Shanghai-based national chain) or national bank loans.
Fifth,  again  as  predictable  from  the  diffusion  model  above,  the  inter-spatial  and  inter-
socioeconomic group patterns of diffusion have differed over large and small cities and towns, and
over richer, middle and poor consumer segments. In general, there has been a trend from supermarkets
occupying only a small niche in capital cities serving only the rich and middle class, to supermarkets
spreading well beyond the middle class in order to penetrate deeply into the food markets of the poor.
They have also spread from big cities to intermediate towns, and in some countries, already to small
towns in rural areas. About 40 percent of Chile’s smaller towns now have supermarkets, as do many
small-to-medium sized towns even in low-income countries like Kenya. And supermarkets are nowe-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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spreading rapidly beyond the top-60 cities of China in the coastal area and are moving to smaller cities
and to the poorer and more remote northwest and southwest and interior.
3.  Supermarkets’ Transforming Procurement Systems
We have found that supermarket chains have a dual objective – one qualitative (to increase quality and
eventually safety of the product) and one quantitative (to reduce costs and increase volumes procured).
Supermarket chains have a difficult time meeting those objectives by using the traditional wholesale
sector to procure their products. Here is a statement from Javier Gallegos (2003), the head of
marketing for Hortifruti (a specialized/dedicated wholesaler for the CARHCO chain in Central
America), enumerating the deficiencies of the traditional market in the face of a supermarket’s needs:
The realities and problems of our growers and markets are as follows. The market is
fragmented, unformatted, unstandardized. The growers produce low quality products,
use bad harvest techniques, there is a lack of equipment and transportation, there is
deficient post-harvest control and infrastructure, there is no market information. There
are high import barriers and corruption. The informal market does not have: research,
statistics,  market  information,  standardized  products,  quality  control,  technical
assistance, infrastructure.
Driven to close the gap between their supplies and their needs, supermarket chains in developing
regions have been shifting over the past few years away from the old procurement model based on
sourcing products from the traditional wholesalers and the wholesale markets, toward the use of four
key pillars of a new kind of procurement system: (1) specialized procurement agents we call
“specialized/dedicated wholesalers”; (2) centralized procurement through Distribution Centers (DCs),
as well as regionalization of procurement; (3) assured and consistent supply through “preferred
suppliers”; and (4) high quality and increasingly safe products through private standards imposed on
suppliers.
The first three pillars (organizational change in procurement) together make possible the fourth
(institutional change in procurement – that is, the rise of private standards first for quality and
increasingly for safety of FFV). Below we lay out a conceptual framework for understanding that shift,
and then discuss the four pillars.
Determinants of change in supermarket procurement systems
Technology change in the procurement systems of supermarkets in developing regions is a key
determinant of change in the markets facing farmers. Technology (defined broadly as physical
production practices as well as management techniques) diffusion in the supermarket sector in
developing  countries  can  also  be  conceptualized  as  a  system  of  demand  and  supply  for  new
technology. Here we focus on technology for retail product procurement systems as these choices most
affect suppliers.
Demand for technology change in food retailer procurement practices is, in general, driven by the
overall competitive strategy of the supermarket chain. However, specific choices are usually taken by
procurement officers, e.g. in the produce procurement division. Hence it is crucial to understand the
objective function of these officers in supermarkets in developing countries. We present a working
hypothesis based on numerous interviews with these individuals.
The decisions related to purchasing products for retail shelves rests with the procurement officers
in supermarket chains. Whether in the United States, Europe, Nicaragua, Chile or China, they are
under several common “pressures” from supermarket managers, operating under intense competition
and low average profit margins. They are caught between the low-cost informal traditional retailerse-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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selling fresh local products on one side, and efficient global chain competitors like Wal-Mart on the
other side. The procurement officers strive to meet this pressure by reducing purchase and transaction
costs and raising product quality. Reflecting the varied demand of consumers, procurement officers
seek to maintain diversity, year-round availability and products with assured quality and safety levels.
Based on those objectives, we outline a rough model for demand (by procurement officers) and
supply (by the supermarket chain to those divisions) of change in procurement systems (technology,
organization, institutions).
We begin with the demand function incentives and capacity variables. Incentives include the ability
of the traditional wholesale system to meet procurement officer objectives without the chain having to
resort to costly investments in an alternative system. Usually procurement officers find this ability low,
as Boselie (2002) shows in the case of Ahold for fresh produce in Thailand. Compared with the North
American or the European market, produce marketing in these regions is characterized by poor
institutional and public physical infrastructure support. Private infrastructure, such as packing houses,
cold chains and shipping equipment among suppliers and distributors is usually inadequate. Risks and
uncertainties, both in output and in suppliers’ responsiveness to incentives, are high. The risks may
arise due to various output and input market failures, such as inadequacies in credit, third-party
certification and market information. A second incentive is the need to reduce costs of procurement by
saving on inputs, in this case purchased product costs and transaction costs with suppliers; and finally,
the incentive to increase procurement of products that can be sold at higher margins – that is, diversify
the product line into “products” rather than mere commodities (bulk items).
Capacity to demand includes the consumer segment served by the chain – this is crucial because
higher-value products cannot be marketed to poorer consumers and only cost considerations are
paramount; and the resources of the procurement office. The latter include the number of staff to
manage  procurement  and  thus  the  ability  to  make  organizational  and  institutional  changes  in
procurement systems such as operating a large distribution center. A variable that reflects both
incentive and capacity is the size of the chain and thus product throughput in the procurement system.
Usually retailers have a “step level” or threshold throughput where they move from per-store to
centralized procurement as economies of scale permit and require.
The supply of procurement technology by the chain as an overarching enterprise, to the specific
product category procurement office or offices, such as the fresh foods categories, is an investment and
is a function of several variables. The incentive variables include the importance of the product
category to the chain’s profits and marketing strategy. For example, we observed a small chain in an
intermediate city in China that invested in building a distribution center (DC) for processed/packaged
foods but continues to buy fresh foods from the spot market (traditional wholesalers); while a national
chain invested in a large DC for packaged/processed foods and has recently built a large DC for fresh
foods as throughput has attained a critical mass, and these products have attained a threshold
importance in profits and chain marketing strategy. A second incentive variable is the need for
assurance of various product attributes in order to meet customers’ demands (expansion of product
choice, attribute consistency over transactions, year-around availability, quality and safety); and a third
is the costs of the technology, such as costs of transport, construction, logistics services, etc.
The capacity variables include the size of the chain and/or access to financial capital to make the
investments; and the capacity of the chain to manage complex and centralized procurement systems.
The incentive and capacity determinants of demand for and supply of changes in procurement
system technology vary markedly over the three regions and countries, and within countries, over
chains and zones. Several broad patterns are observed in the procurement technologies that result.e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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First pillar of change: Toward centralization and regionalization of procurement
There is a trend toward centralization of procurement (per chain). As the number of stores in a given
supermarket chain grows, there is a tendency to shift from a per-store procurement system, to a
distribution center serving several stores in a given zone, district, country, or a given region (which
may cover several countries). This is accompanied by fewer procurement officers and increased use of
centralized warehouses. Additionally, increased levels of centralization may also occur in the
procurement  decision-making  process  and  in  the  physical  produce  distribution  processes.
Centralization increases efficiency of procurement by reducing coordination and other transaction
costs, although it may increase transport costs by extra movement of the actual products.
The top three global retailers have made or are making shifts toward more centralized procurement
system in all the regions in which they operate. Wal-Mart uses a centralized procurement system in
most of its operating areas. Having centralized its procurement in France, Carrefour has been moving
quickly to centralize its procurement system in other countries. For example, in 2003 and 2004 Tesco
and Ahold have established large distribution centers in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In
2001 Carrefour established a distribution center in São Paulo to serve three Brazilian states (with 50
million consumers) with 50 hypermarkets (equivalent to about 500 supermarkets) in the Southeast
Region. Similarly, Carrefour is building a national distribution system with several distribution center
nodes in China, while Ahold centralized its procurement systems in Thailand (Boselie 2002). The list
goes on.
Regional chains, such as China Resources Enterprises (CRE) of Hong Kong – with Vanguard
stores in southern China, are also centralizing their procurement systems. CRE is tenth in retail in
China and has 17 large stores in the provinces of Shenzhen and Guangdong. In anticipation of growth
following its planned $680 million investment in China over the next five years, a shift from store-by-
store procurement to a centralized system of procurement covering each province is underway. Two
large distribution centers were completed in 2002. The distribution center in Shenzhen is 65 000
square meters and will be able to handle 40 department stores and 400 superstores/discount centers.
Moreover, the regional (over several countries) chains are moving toward sourcing regionally. We
hypothesize that this will be, over the next decade, a factor inducing greater intra-regional trade and
economic integration in regions. For example, in January 2002, a regional chain called Central
American Retail Holding Company (CARHCO) was formed, composed of a Costa Rican chain (CSU
Supermarkets) that had expanded into Honduras and Nicaragua, a Guatemalan chain (La Fragua) that
expanded into El Salvador and Ahold. The chain started with 253 stores in five countries and 1.3
billion U.S. dollars of sales, a large operation with about two-thirds of the supermarket sector in those
countries. It started by sourcing only locally (the chain in each country mainly sourcing from local
producers). However, over the past year, and with plans to increase this in the near future, the chain is
starting to source regionally: for example, sourcing from Nicaragua most of the dry beans for the
whole chain.
Second pillar of change: Shift toward use of specialized wholesalers and logistics firms
There is growing use of specialized/dedicated wholesalers. They are specialized in a product category
and dedicated to the supermarket sector as their main clients. The changes in supplier logistics have
moved supermarket chains toward new intermediaries, side-stepping or transforming the traditional
wholesale system. The supermarkets are increasingly working with specialized wholesalers, dedicated
to and capable of meeting their specific needs. These specialized wholesalers cut transaction and
search costs and enforce private standards and contracts on behalf of the supermarkets. The emergence
and operation of the specialized wholesalers has promoted convergence, in terms of players and
product standards, between the export and the domestic food markets. Moreover, there is emerging
evidence that when supermarket chains source imported produce they tend to do so mainly viae-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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specialized  importers.  For  example,  hypermarkets  in  China  tend  to  work  with  specialized
importers/wholesalers of fruit, who in turn sell nearly half of their imported products to supermarket
chains (McClafferty 2002). Similarly, Hortifruti functions as the buying arm of most stores of the main
supermarket chain in Central America, as does Freshmark for Shoprite in Africa.
Moreover,  there  is  a  trend  toward  logistics  improvements  to  accompany  procurement
consolidation. To defray some of the added transport costs that arise with centralization, supermarket
chains have adopted (and required that suppliers adopt) best-practice logistical technology. This
requires that supermarket suppliers adopt practices and make physical investments which allow almost
frictionless  logistical  interface  with  the  chain’s  warehouses.  The  “Code  of  Good  Commercial
Practices” signed by supermarket chains and suppliers in Argentina illustrates the use of best-practice
logistics by retail suppliers (Brom 2002). Similar trends are noted in Asia. For example, Ahold
instituted a supply improvement programme for vegetable suppliers in Thailand, specifying post-
harvest and production practices to assure consistent supply and improve the efficiency of their
operation (Boselie 2002).
Retail chains in the three regions increasingly outsource (sometimes to a company in the same
holding company as the supermarket chain) logistics and wholesale distribution function, entering joint
ventures with other firms. An example is the Carrefour distribution center in Brazil, which is the
product of a joint venture of Carrefour with Cotia Trading (a major Brazilian wholesaler distributor)
and Penske Logistics (a United States global multinational firm). Similarly, Wu-mart of China
announced in March 2002 (CIES 2002) that it will build a large distribution center to be operated
jointly with Tibbett and Britten Logistics (a British global multinational firm). Ahold’s distribution
center for fruits and vegetables in Thailand is operated in partnership with TNT Logistics of the
Netherlands (Boselie 2002).
Third pillar: Toward preferred supplier systems
Many supermarket chains are undertaking institutional innovation by establishing contracts with their
suppliers – in particular via their dedicated, specialized wholesalers’ managing a preferred supplier
system  for  them.  This  trend  is  similar  to  that  in  agroprocessing  during  the  past  decade
(Schejtman 1996). The contract is established when the retailer (via their wholesaler or directly) “lists”
a supplier. That listing is an informal (usually) but effective contract
4 – in which delisting carries some
cost, tangible or intangible. We have observed such contracts in all the regions under study. Contracts
serve as incentives to the suppliers to stay with the buyer and over time make investments in assets
(such as learning and equipment) specific to the retailer specifications regarding the products. The
retailers are assured of on-time delivery and the delivery of products with desired quality attributes.
These contracts sometimes include direct or indirect assistance for farmers to make investments in
human capital, management, input quality and basic equipment. Evidence is emerging that for many
small farms these assistance programmes are the only source of such much valued inputs and
assistance – in particular where public systems have been dismantled or coverage is inadequate. In
some cases, the assistance is indirect – such as the case of Metro supermarket chain (a German chain)
in Croatia intervening with the bank (noting that the suppliers would have contracts) to provide a
“collateral substitute” so would-be strawberry suppliers could make needed greenhouse investments
(Reardon et al. 2003b).
This constitutes resolution by retailers or their wholesaler agents of idiosyncratic factor market
failures facing small producers – such as credit, information, technical assistance and so on. There is
evidence of this in the processing sector also, for example in the CEE (Gow and Swinnen 2001; Dries
and Swinnen 2004). Some cases of this are remarkable in their extent and nature. Codron et al. (2004)
note a case of a Turkish retailer MIGROS which contracts with a whole village nearby its Antalya
market to grow 1000 tons of tomatoes during the summer. Hu et al. (2004) describe the case of
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Xincheng Foods in Shanghai, acting as a specialized wholesaler for the top two chains in China.
Xincheng long-term leases (from townships) 1000 hectares of prime vegetable land, hires migrant
labour,  installs  greenhouses  and  uses  tractors  and  drip  irrigation  (thus  changing  production
technology), and produces in-house large quantities of high quality vegetables for the supermarket
chains and export. It also has contracts with 4500 small farmers to add to its own production. This kind
of operation can be described as a major “agent of change” in the Chinese agrifood economy.
While the contracting is quite recent for produce, it has been a practice for a half decade or more
among chains sourcing from processed product suppliers. Manufacturers of private label processed
fruit and vegetable and meat and cereals products typically operate under formal contract with the
supermarkets. Supermarket chains have contracts with processing firms, who in turn may sign
contracts  with  producers.  For  example,  the  processing  firm  IANSAFRUT supplies processed
vegetables  to  supermarkets  in  Chile  under  such  an  arrangement  (Milicevic,  Berdegue  and
Reardon 1998). Similarly, processed fruits and vegetables are sold under the label SABEMAS for the
supermarket CSU in Costa Rica, and various firms produce under contract the products for the private
label. As retail sales of private label products continue to grow, such contract arrangements are
expected to increase in Latin America and Asia.
Fourth pillar: The rise of private standards
While food retailing in these regions previously operated in the informal market, with little use of
certifications and standards, the emerging trend indicates a rapid rise in the implementation of private
standards in the supermarket sector (and other modern food industry sectors such as medium/large
scale food manufactures and food service chains). The rise of private standards for quality and safety
of food products, and the increasing importance of the enforcement of (otherwise virtually not
enforced) public standards, is a crucial aspect of the imposition of product requirements in the
procurement systems. In general, these standards function as instruments of coordination of supply
chains by standardizing product requirements over suppliers, who may cover many regions or
countries. Standards specify and harmonize the product and delivery attributes, thereby enhancing
efficiency and lowering transaction costs. In turn, the implementation of these standards depends
crucially on the establishment of the new procurement system organization noted in the three pillars
above.
The general adoption framework can be applied to “institutional adoption” such as the adoption of
private standards by supermarket chains’ procurement arms or agents in developing regions. The
incentives include the following.
First, the chain has an incentive to implement private standards where there are missing or
inadequate public standards – so that private standards are a substitute for the missing institution. As
the large chains (and processing firms) competed in national and regional markets and attempted to
differentiate their products to protect and gain market share, they found that: the public standards
needed for that differentiation did not exist (common in developing regions, see Stephenson 1997); or
relatively undifferentiated public standards existed, inherited from the protected, homogeneous
commodity markets that were common before market liberalization and structural adjustment. The
latter were inadequate either to meet consumer demand for product differentiation and quality
differences, or to reward producers for their investments in quality and safety (Reardon et al. 2001;
Reardon and Farina 2002). As noted above, governments in these regions tend to have the incentive
and capacity to implement public standards mainly for the export market interface, and much less so
for domestic markets. Moreover, public standards tend to be applied where they are “public goods”
such as for plant and animal health. At the opposite extreme are quality standards that are typically
private goods – differentiating products – and are the first and foremost domain of private standards.
Between the two are food safety standards. In principal, these should be considered public goods
and set and enforced by governments. The issue here is not conceptual but rather practical –
governments might occasionally establish regulations but usually do not have the capacity to monitor
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to set private safety standards, at least for “at risk” products such as leafy greens, berries and other
products where pesticide residuals and bacteria can produce short-medium run health problems among
their clientele. In some countries there are liability laws that make this a legal issue. Yet even where
there are not laws, there are two other reasons to have such standards. On the one hand, as noted
above, most of the chains are global or regional, and a health crisis caused by an unsafe product in one
country can hurt sales and stock prices in the region or globally. On the other hand, safety standards –
and the belief on the part of the consumer that chains are able to actually monitor and enforce them –
gives a big advantage to supermarkets over traditional retailers, and thus is a major competitive
instrument.
Of course, where there are public standards for safety, private standards can meet or exceed the
stringency of public standards thus affording “domain defense”, limiting exposure to penalties from
public regulations (Caswell and Johnson 1991). Communicating to the urban or developed country
consumer that the private standards exceed the stringency and enforcement of public standards
encourages consumers to buy products from countries that they may see otherwise as having lax
quality and safety regulations.
Second, private standards are used to increase profits through facilitating product differentiation –
and thus provide incentives to suppliers to make asset-specific investments, and to consumers to
satisfy their desire for product diversity by shopping at the chain. Supermarkets (as well as large-scale
processors and fast-food chains) use private standards to differentiate their product lines (adding SKUs
and thus product diversity) and differentiate their products from each other and from traditional actors.
Private standards make product differentiation easier and more flexible, allowing companies to take
advantage of new market opportunities (“domain offense”, Caswell and Johnson 1991). Consistent
implementation of private standards, plus certification, labeling and branding systems that link high
quality and safety standards to the product and the company in the consumer’s mind, produces
reputation and competitive advantage. One sees this in the application of the Carrefour Quality
Certification programme and labels for meat and produce in Mexico, China, Brazil and elsewhere.
Third, chains use private standards to reduce cost and risk in their supply chains. The main cost
reduction comes from using process standards to coordinate chains. Farina (2002) and Gutman (2002)
illustrate these cost savings in the case of supermarkets and dairy products in Brazil and Argentina.
Chains complement private standards with other elements of a “metasystem of quality control”
(Caswell et al. 1998), adding elements such as branding to the system governance structure. Building
trust and reputation around the visible symbol of a brand name and label make standards systems
credible to consumers (Northen and Henson 1999). To build consumer confidence (and thus build
market volume and reduce market risk) by consistency in standards implementation, tight vertical
coordination is needed, especially for process standards – hence the use of the organizational structure
of procurement, plus contracts, noted above.
An important element of this is the reduction of coordination costs in procurement systems that
become progressively broader in geographic scope, as the discussion of the first pillar above
establishes as a trend. Regional and global chains want to cut costs by standardizing over countries and
suppliers as this occurs – which induces a convergence with the standards of the toughest market in the
set, including with European or United States standards. One sees this in Wal-Mart between Mexico
and the United States, one sees this in the Quality Assurance Certification used by Carrefour over its
global operations that include developing countries, one sees this in the regional chains such as
CARHCO discussed above. In some cases this has meant that global chains actually apply public
standards from their developed country markets as private standards to suppliers to their local
developing country markets, such as the use of FDA standards for some products by United States
chains. The chains might also use private standards from the developed country portions of their
markets, such as European chains using EUREPGAP standards for some produce and meat items
applied to suppliers in developing country markets.
The capacity variables involved in the diffusion of private standards are as follows. First, the
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impose private standards on suppliers – either because the chain has some oligopsonistic power, or
because it offers higher producer prices, or it offers other assistance to producers. The size of the
frontrunner chains (the same ones that are the main implementers of private standards) relative to the
urban market certainly gives them the buying power (for example, Carrefour has about 25 percent of
all food retail in Argentina).
Large chain size is necessary but not sufficient – as chains need the procurement organization
changes noted above, in particular distribution centers that allow the product procurement to be
centralized allowing efficient standards monitoring, and implicit contracts (via the preferred supplier
systems) which allow traceability and a delivery vehicle for the standards.
Sometimes chains also offer prices higher than the wholesale market prices to producers who meet
their standards; little systematic information exists about this point, but in general we have found that
the premium is around 10 to 15 percent, just enough to meet additional costs implied by meeting the
standards. But sometimes no price premium is offered: what then is the incentive for the producer to
meet the (usually more stringent) private standards? The answer is related to the discussion of the
preferred supplier systems above: chains (or their specialized/dedicated wholesalers) sometimes offer
technical assistance, input credit or collateral substitutes in the form of a contract, and transport to their
suppliers An example is Hortifruti’s technical assistance and credit to vegetable suppliers in Costa
Rica. The technical assistance and credit resolve idiosyncratic factor market failures that often plague
producers after public systems for these items were dismantled during the structural adjustment period
– and one can hypothesize that public systems were never nor are now adequate to meet the kinds of
upgrading needs that face suppliers to supermarkets.
Second, all of the above is necessary but not sufficient to implement private standards; the final
ingredient is the capacity of producers to meet the standards. A poignant illustration of this was the
limitation felt by the La Fragua chain in Guatemala to implement broadly its new “Paiz Seal” quality
and safety certification system in the past two years. They found the following: (1) for key bulk items
such as Roma tomatoes, there were simply not enough producers with the capacity to supply over the
full year or sufficient volume to meet the chain’s needs, and so the chain has to rely on traditional
wholesalers to bulk the product from many small producers – obviating traceability and imposition of
safety standards and quality consistency; (2) for key “at risk” items such as leafy greens and berries,
the chain has been forced to take a gradual approach of approving suppliers, at a rate much slower than
it wanted, simply because few producers can make the needed investments, and those producers have
export market alternatives. Because of these limitations on finding enough suppliers that can meet the
private standards, some chains take a position in between no application of standards and full, rigorous
application. For example, CSU Supermarkets/Hortifruti in Costa Rica monitors standards compliance,
but then is loathe to “delist” suppliers who violate standards, even safety standards. Instead, when a
problem is identified, they increase technical assistance combined with warnings, with some eventual
delisting (hence, the combination of a carrot and stick approach, but not too stern so as to find
themselves with inadequate supply) (Berdegue et al. 2004).
4.  Implications for Producers and Agricultural Development
Meeting transaction requirements implied by the organizational change in supermarket procurement
systems, and the product requirements implied by institutional change in the form of private standards,
can present clear opportunities for producers. Adopting the new practices can open the door to
suppliers of selling through supermarket chains that are “growing” the market in terms of volume,
value added and diversity. A supplier can move from being a local supplier to a national, regional or
global supplier. Moreover, private process standards can increase efficiency of firm operations and
raise profitability. The market scope could also increase, compensating for per-unit profit decreases
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  However, meeting these non-traditional market requirements implies changes in production
practices and investments, such as coordinating to aggregate volumes, reducing pesticide use, or
investing in “electric eyes” in packing sheds and cooling tanks in dairies. Some of these investments
are quite costly, and are simply unaffordable by many small firms and farms. It is thus not surprising
that the evidence is mounting that the changes in standards, and the implied investments, have driven
many small firms and farms out of business in developing countries over the past 5 to 10 years, and
accelerated industry concentration.
The supermarket chains, locked in struggle with other chains in a highly competitive industry with
low margins, seek constantly to lower product and transaction costs and risk – and all that points
toward selecting only the most capable farmers, and in many developing countries that means mainly
the medium and large farmers. Moreover, as supermarkets compete with each other and with the
informal sector, they will not allow consumer prices to increase in order to “pay for” the farm-level
investments needed. Who will pay for wells with safe water? Latrines and hand-washing facilities in
the fields? Record keeping systems? Clean and proper packing houses with cement floors? The
supplier does and will bear the financial burden. As small farmers lack access to credit and large fixed
costs are a burden for a small operation, this will be a huge challenge for small operators. It is thus
inevitable that standards demanded by consumers are increasingly a major driver of concentration in
the farm sector in developing regions. Retail concentration will cascade, sooner or later, into supplier
concentration.
To help many small farmers grasp the opportunities these changes imply in the short to medium
run,  and  those  that  cannot  to  transition  into  other  employment  in  the  medium  to  longer  run,
development programmes will have a challenge and a mandate to assist small farmers to make the
transition.e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 1, No. 2,  pp. 168-183, 2004
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